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Es ist süss sich Staatsverfassungen auszudenken.
Kant: Streit der Fakultäten1
Abstract. Kants political and legal theory is now thought to be one of the most important contributions to the 
theory of modern constitutionalism. The paper is an attempt to distil the fundamental principles of constitutional 
law as implemented in modern constitutional review from the writings of Kant. It examines the idea of the 
constitution as a social contract and its relation to popular sovereignty. Second, the principles of “republican 
constitution”–liberty, equality and independence (autonomy)–follow. These principles condense the essence of 
what we now call fundamental constitutional rights. Third, the transcendental maxim of legislation, that is, the 
publicity is analysed; the principle of the publicity of legislation is (under various names like equality, public 
reasoning and discussion, freedom of speech) fundamental for modern constitutionalism (or neo-constitutionalism). 
Constitutional courts are organs of the “public use of reason” so important for Kant and revived recently by Rawls. 
The last section is a discussion of the relationship of morality and constitutional government. Kant regarded the 
law as a coercive order a precondition for moral autonomy but he did not qualiﬁ ed constitutional principles 
“moral”. Thus, the Kantian interpretation of constitutionalism does not support the moral reading or interpretation 
of the constitution; instead, the principles of the “lawful” constitution are based (like the maxims of morality) on 
practical reason.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Writing about the relationship of Kant and constitutional review of legislation as we know 
it today is literally an anachronism: Kant is not the theoretician of constitutional review, 
since in his age and for him it was simply non-existent.2 Still, Kant has a lot to say for 
constitutional review and I hope this will become manifest from the following lines. Kant’s 
political and legal philosophy was for a long time neglected as the symptom of his elderly 
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1 “It is a pleasure to invent constitutions for ourselves.” Still, he continues: the attempt of the 
people to realise them shall be punished. (SA XI 366.)
2 Fichte, a follower of Kant (at least he thought he was), in his Natural Law of 1796 deduces the 
necessity of constitutional review. See Fichte, J. G.: Grundlage des Naturrechts (Hrsg.: Medicus, F.), 
Leipzig, 1907, 175 skk.
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spiritual weakness according to the familiar disrespectful remark3 of the otherwise Kant-
admirer Schopenhauer. Even the neo-Kantians as Stammler and implicitly Kelsen accepted 
this view. Nowadays they are regarded as a major part of his work. It sufﬁ ces to mention 
the political philosophy of John Rawls, who relies on Kant, furthermore, the philosophy of 
Jürgen Habermas and Ottfried Höffe as well as of János Kis in Hungary.4 
The recent rediscovery of the legal philosophy of Kant was undoubtedly supported 
by the widespread acceptance of what I propose to call substantive constitutional review. 
By substantive constitutional review I mean the examination of the legal validity of legal 
substance, i.e. legally binding, permitted, etc. conduct based on constitutional justiﬁ ability, 
while the standard of constitutional justiﬁ ability is substantiated by fundamental 
constitutional rights and other constitutional principles deﬁ ning the substance of law.5 
Putting aside details of legal history, it is important that constitutional review is a relatively 
new development, since it appeared gradually in the form familiar today in Europe mainly 
after the II World War (and much earlier in the United States which remained a solitary 
phenomenon for a century or more). Present-day substantive (or content-based) constitutional 
review is conceptually closely related to the rational law cultivated also in the age of Kant, 
on which he delivered lectures at university.6 In modern substantive constitutional review, 
which in the following I will call neo-constitutionalism7, several issues, which in the age of 
Kant and in the following centuries for a long time were discussed as matters of natural or 
rational law, that is, philosophical matters “within the boundaries of pure reason”, are in our 
days adjudged by constitutional courts as positive issues of constitutional law. Present-day 
constitutions incorporate “lauter Prinzipen a priori” [a priori principles] as legal principles 
and if the constitution is regarded as part of the legal system (which is the prerequisite of 
constitutional review), it will be also applied as positive law. A consequence of this is that 
during reasoning in constitutional review similar issues need to be adjudged by similar 
arguments like formerly the followers of the natural law school did. The followers of the 
rational law school including Kant–as the Streit der Fakultäten proves–examined these 
issues theoretically as philosophical ones (as issues of practical reason), whereas today in 
neo-constitutionalist constitutional review these issues need to be settled via legal reasoning. 
3 Schopenhauer, A.: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I. In: Schopenhauer, A.: Sämtliche 
Werke. (Hrsg.: Freiherr von Löhneysen, H.-W.), Frankfurt am Main, 1986, I. 707. (The parody of the 
Kantian style). For a similar opinion see Arendt, H.: Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (ed.: 
Beiner, R.). Chicago, 1992, 8.
4 See Kiss, J.: Vannak-e emberi jogaink? (Do We Have Human Rights?) Budapest, 1986 (3rd 
ed., Budapest, 2003).
5 Ferrajoli, L.: Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale. Bari, 2000, 904 skk.
6 See data and resources on page XXI skk. in the foreword to the edition of Metaphysik der 
Sitten. In: Vorländer, K.: Philosophische Bibliothek. Hamburg, 1959. The course books used by Kant 
(Baumgarten, Achenwall) can be found in the volumes Akademie Ausgabe. Deutsche (formerly 
Königlich Preussische) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin, 1900, (AA) XIX skk. Cf. 
Busch, W.: Die Entstehung der kritischen Rechtsphilosophie Kants. Berlin, 1979.
7 This appropriate term in this sense is primarily applied in the legal literature of Neo-Latin 
countries. See, e.g. Carbonell, M. (ed.): Teoría del neoconstitucionalismo. Ensayos escogidos. Madrid, 
2007.
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What in Kant’s age was subject only to the “Verfassungsrichterstuhl der Rechtsvernunft”8 
(the constitutional court of legal reason), in many legal systems in our days it is subject to 
the jurisdiction of constitutional courts, therefore, it is conceived as positive law. 
Simultaneously, a lot has changed: positive law has a greater role in the concept of 
Rechtsvernunft, hopefully not to the detriment of Vernunft. At any rate, legal reasoning and 
decision-making have more institutional, procedural and substantive constraints than 
philosophical and pure rational legal reasoning. At any rate the ultimate controlling role of 
practical reason in legal reasoning cannot be given up.9
The relationship between practical (including legal) reason and present-day 
constitutional review is not accidental: the theory of modern constitutionalism originates in 
the Enlightenment and Kant is the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment. Therefore, it 
is the provisional negligence and not the re-discovery of Kant’s legal philosophy that is 
astonishing. In Kant’s legal and political philosophy we can ﬁ nd the fundamental principles 
of the modern constitutional state and neo-constitutionalist constitutional law. In the 
following, I will examine some of the related issues analysed by Kant, which are 
foundational in contemporary constitutional theory, as well. I will neither engage in a Kant 
exegesis, nor in the interpretation of Kant, but in the paraphrase of some of his thoughts. 
The ﬁ rst issue to be examined will be the concept of the constitution as a social 
contract, the second one will be our meaning of the principles of the “republican 
constitution”, then I will analyse the maxim of legislation and its relation to constitutional 
review. Finally, while examining the thinking of the greatest moralist of all the times, we 
cannot fail to mention the relationship of the constitution and morality. Needless to say, 
however, for order’s sake let me mention that a great many of Kant’s relevant thoughts will 
be disregarded.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT
For Kant, the concept of the constitution is not an idea of positive law, but a Vernunftidee 
[an idea of reason], that is, it is not subject to written law, or, in Kant’s terms, empirical (or 
statutory) or positive law, in other terms to experience, therefore, it is not an issue pertaining 
to the faculty of law (that is, the jurisprudence of positive law). Accordingly, Kant does not 
apply the concept of the constitution in our terms. There is nothing special about this, since 
in that era and for a long time subsequently the constitution was not primarily a legal, but a 
normative political concept. The constitution became the object of empirical legislation, 
which is Kant’s term for positive law, via the constitutional charters in Kant’s age, at the 
end of the 18th century.10 Written constitutions, such as the French constitution of 1791 
were not legal constitutions: they were rather political principles derived from a political 
philosophy and written down in a solemn charter. This was entailed by the natural law or 
rather the rational legal conception prevalent in that age, according to which evident legal 
principles just as the rules of logic need not be, or as others think, must not be enacted as 
8 Kersting, W.: Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Berlin, 1984, 222. (3rd ed., Paderborn, 2007); and 
Kersting, W.: Der Geltungsgrund von Moral und Recht bei Kant. In: Kersting, W.: Politik und Recht. 
Veilerwist, 2000, 304 skk. The following considerably differs from the construction of Kersting. 
9 This is the meaning of Alexy’s so-called “Sonderfallthese”, according to which legal reasoning 
is a special case of practical reasoning as construed by Habermas, R. A.: Theorie der juristischen 
Argumentation. Frankfurt am Main, 1978 (1983), 32 skk., 263 skk.
10 Troper, M.–Jaume, L. (eds): 1789 et l’invention de la constitution. Paris–Brussels, 1994.
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statute-law but at most they can be solemnly declared.11 What in our days we designate as 
constitutional or fundamental rights, in the age of the Enlightenment they were valid not on 
grounds of positive law, but out of practical reason. According to Kant, positive law has 
always and only contingent content and has nothing to do with the validity of the necessary–
and for this reason non-contingent–principles of law.12 No matter how we conceive of the 
legal nature of the constitutions of the 18th–19th centuries, they were indisputably not 
designed to be applied by the judiciary, since such courts did not exist and that was no mere 
chance.13
For Kant, the concepts of the state and the constitution are of course related, since the 
constitution determines the form of government and the relation of state powers. However, 
its foundation is the “Ursprünlicher Vertrag”. As he formulates: “Der Akt, wodurch sich das 
Volk selbst zu einem Staat konstituirert, eigentlich aber nur die Idee derselben […] ist der 
ursprunglüche Kontrakt, nach welchem alle … im Volk ihre aussere Freiheit ausgeben … 
seine Freiheit überhaupt in einer gesetzlichen Abhängigkeit, d.i. in einer rechtlichen Zustand 
... zu ﬁ nden; weil diese Abhängigkeit aus seinem eigenen gesetzgebenden Willen entspringt.” 
[The act, or rather its mere idea, by which a people constitutes itself as a state consists in 
the original contract, according to which the people resigns its external freedom, so that it 
should ﬁ nd its freedom in dependence on the law, i.e. in the condition of the law.] (SA VIII 
434) Of course, the idea of the social contract is not the invention of Kant, whereas, the 
pure normative application of the social contract as a regulative idea may derive from him, 
at least in its radical form. Kant had excellent “anthropological” knowledge (see e.g. SA 
XII 399), he did not believe that any kind of contract constitutive of a society could have 
really obtained. On such grounds he associates the concept (idea) of the constitution with 
the idea of the social contract and deﬁ nes the constitution as a pactum unionios civilis (SA 
XI 144). He literally sets forth in “Eternal Peace”: “Verfassung … welche aus der des 
ursprünglichen Vertrags hervorgeht” [constitution deriving from the original contract] (SA 
XI 204). As we see, Kant explicitly considers the constitution to be a social contract.
By conceiving the constitution as an idea, Kant regards the people which constitutes 
itself in the constitution as an ideal people. Since the people does not exist before (and 
without) the social contract, it cannot reason about the origin of the supreme power (SA 
VIII 437). Thereby, he articulates the foundational idea of constitutionalism: people’s 
sovereignty dissolves in the constitution, since the Volkswille and the Souverän are qualiﬁ ed 
as mere Gedankending, which “keine objektive praktische Realität hat” [the people’s will 
and the sovereign are mere thoughts, which do not have any objective practical reality] (SA 
VIII 461). Thus, the constitution absorbes the sovereignty of the people through transforming 
it into an idea. According to Kant, we can distinguish two elements in the constitution: the 
establishment of the political constitution or constitutional law, the rules of government and 
11 The term of déclaration clearly implies the acknowledgement of the already existant more 
explicitly than the Hungarian term of “nyilatkozat”: The Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 
1789 as its text elucidates only openly acknowledges, but does not constitute the always existing (and 
persisting) rights. See Troper, M.: La déclaration de droits de l’homme et citoyen en 1789. In: Troper, 
M.: Pour une théorie juridique de l’Etat. Paris, 1994, 317 skk.
12 This is how we can construe Kant’s remark on the concept of law of lawyers in the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft, as it is pointed out by Bódog Somló. Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. 2nd ed., 
Leipzig, 1927, 52 skk.
13 The jury constituionnaire as conceived by Sieyes has miscarried in practice. Pasquino, P.: 
Siéyès et l’invention de la constititution en France. Paris, 1998, 193.
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“the legal condition” (Rechtszustand), especially in the republican constitution (which I 
shall discuss separately). For Kant, the constitution is the foundation of the validity of the 
law (to use modern terms); therefore, the concept of the constitution is closely related to 
Kant’s concept of law. This concept is dual: on the one hand, the contents of law ensures 
the reconciliation of the external freedom of individuals, which I shall examine in the next 
section. On the other hand, according to Kant, law is based on coercion (“Befugnis zu 
zwingen” SA VIII 338): without coercion no positive law can exist. However, coercion in 
this case means the legitimacy of the use of coercion, not its actual application. 
The conception of the constitution as a social contract facilitates the understanding of 
the link between the constitution and people’s sovereignty (as the substance of the 
constitution). Kant conceives the constitution not simply as the establishement of social life 
unter Rechtsgesetzen, that is, under the rules of law but he identiﬁ es the people with those 
who unite on the basis of such a contract. People’s sovereignty is the criterion of the 
substance of the correct (just) constitution, but it cannot manifest itself in the practical 
activity of the people. The constitution as a social contract and popular sovereignty in the 
representative–according to Kant’s and the contemporary general terminology: republican–
constitution are essentially identical. Kant repudiates democracy, by which he means direct 
democracy, whereas, he considers representational and necessarily constitutional democracy 
to be a necessary element of a lawful (that is just) constitution. 
These thoughts proved to be very productive in modern constitutional theory especially 
in the neo-constitutionalist school of thought in constitutional law, as well as in modern 
political philosophy, which is according to Rawls the theory of constitutional democracy.14 
In terms of constitutional law, the conception of the constitution as a social contract provides 
an acceptable theory, which is legally interpretable, that is, applicable in constitutional legal 
reasoning as to the interpretation of people’s sovereignty under constitutional law. The 
construction of the popular sovereignty in modern constitutions as a social contract has 
many advantages. On the one hand, neither the people as the subject of the social contract, 
nor the social contract or the idea of the constitution are empirical concepts. This conception 
results in several important consequences as to the substance and interpretation of the 
constitution. The most important of these with regard to the modern neo-constitutionalist 
constitutional practice is that only such an interpretation of the constitution complies with 
the substance of the constitution, which also complies with the constitution construed as a 
social contract. That is, the ultimate criterion of truth as to the interpretation of the 
constitution consists in the fact whether the result of the interpretation is acceptable as the 
substance of the constitution as a social contract.15
Another advantage of the construction of the constitution as a social contract is that it 
clearly articulates that the constitutive and foundational concept of constitutional democracy 
is the equality of those living in unity of title in the constitutional state. It follows, then, that 
popular sovereignty and constitution are not simply normative but meta-normative concepts. 
14 Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism. New York, 1993, XXVII., 135. And see Kis, J.: Alkotmányos 
demokrácia (Constitutional Democracy). Budapest, 2000.
15 Let’s see an example instead of further explication. If I do not know whether I am a homosexual 
or not, whether I am a man or a woman, would I accept the discrimination of homosexuals or women 
under the constitution as the substance of a social contract, that is, such an interpretation of the 
constitution, according to which, e.g. the limitation of the political rights of women is constitutionally 
justiﬁ able. Therefore, the ultimate standard of the correctness of the interpretation of the constitution is 
whether the result of the interpretation could be an independent constitutional norm. 
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That means that the popular sovereignty cannot correspond to any empirical-social fact: the 
constitutional people as a sovereign exists only in the constitution, or rather in its idea.16 
The notion of the constitutional people implies ideal unity of the titular of the constitutional 
powers (the pouvoir constituant) and each person subject to the constitutional law and order 
ut singuli. Which at the same time determines the constitutional relationship between the 
collective people, which can only be a majority, and the people as a set of free individuals. 
The collective people in the political constitution of constitutional democracy can manifest 
itself only in a voting and decision-making procedure: majority decision replaces unanimous 
decision which is impossible in practice. Consensus in modern constitutionalism is replaced 
by the parts of the constitution which are excluded from majority decision and not revisable 
by constitutional amendments. These include primarily fundamental rights (such as the 
complex of legal positions unconditionally due to each individual), which cannot be limited 
by majority legislation, furthermore, the fundamental rules of the constitution, without 
which the constitution could not persist. In this perspective, majority voting is but a technical 
device and not the essence of constitutional democracy.
In modern legal systems the constitution has two fundamental legal functions: the 
constitution is the legal foundation of the legality of the legal system (formally, the highest 
source of law): this is the minimally necessary constitution for the persistence of the legal 
system. The second, and in neo-constitutionalist legal systems the basic function of the 
constitution is the legal determination of the contents of the law. In this latter role, the 
constitution determines the mandatory and prohibited substance of the law: the norm-
principles, which must justify the norms regulating the conduct of the individual in the 
legal system.17 The constitutional norm-justifying principles, in particular the constitutional 
rights can be considered the content of the constitution as a social contract (even if they are 
simultaneously principles of political philosophy or of natural law). I construe fundamental 
rights or constitutional rights as the complex of legal positions guaranteed for each member 
of the society, which can be acknowledged as legal positions due to each person by all 
rationally thinking persons in a society. This elucidates the contrafactic character of the 
constitution as a social contract. The social contract theory is a thought experiment aiming 
at the justiﬁ cation of a social condition or complex of norms (the constitution in our case). 
It is a thought experiment questioning whether ideally rational and fully informed persons 
would accept the constitutional norms or the social condition established under the 
constitution.
The conception of popular sovereignty as a social contract demands constitutional 
justiﬁ cation in two distinct steps. The ﬁ rst step is the justiﬁ cation of the content of the 
constitution, that is, the constitutional rights and other constitutional properties of the 
society. A justiﬁ cation may consist in the Rawlsian abstraction from the social status of the 
16 János Kis attributes considerably more reality to the sovereignty of the people, than I do. See 
Kis, J.: Népszuverenitás. A klasszikus tan és kritikája (People’s Sovereignty. The Classical Doctrine 
and Its Critique). Politikatudományi Szemle, 15 (2006) 1, 5 skk.
17 For the sake of simplicity, I will not deal with the organisational parts of the constitutions 
determining the form of government, that is, the political constitution in the strict sense. If the 
constitution is part of the positive legal system, the same applies to its organisational rules and to its 
norm-justifying norms. Kant’s explications about the political constitution do not add anything to that 
of Montesquieu (trias politica); therefore, they have only historical signiﬁ cance. We need to note that 
Kant was a subject of Frederick the Great, a fact he mentions with some irony [Weischedel, W. 
(Hrsg.): Studienausgabe. Frankfurt am Main, (SA) 1977. XI 267]. 
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individual upon the selection of fundamental constitutional norms (behind “the veil of 
ignorance”),18 or else in an ideal discourse-situation as proposed by Habermas. By the 
constitutional properties of a society I mean all the properties of a society which cannot be 
but unique and the same for each and every member in a society. Examples of constitutional 
property are the legal system, the form of government (a state can not be a monarchy and a 
republic at the same time), the system of ownership, territory, etc. The second grade of 
justiﬁ cation consists in the application of the social contract embodied in the constitution, 
which in neo-constitutionalist legal systems adopting constitutional review equals the legal 
construction of the constitution. Here I cannot engage in a detailed justiﬁ cation of theory 
set out in outlines above. Sufﬁ ce it to say that the constitution does not consist of rules of 
conduct, but of norms about norms, therefore, constitutional review consists in the 
interpretation and application of constitutional norms in the examination of the 
constitutionality of the norms of the legal system.
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: 
FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND “INDEPENDENCE”
Kant held that the telos of human history is the achievement of the constitutional state 
(vollkommene Staatsvervassung) (Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht. SA XI 33, 45) making possible the full expansion of the capabilities of mankind. 
Kant explicates in three of his works that a constitution of full value can be but the 
republican constitution (SA VIII 432 skk; SA XI 144 skk; 204). The Kantian republican 
constitution based on reason is very close to the neo-constitutionalist constitution, since the 
republican constitution is not a political constitution (it is not concerned primarily with the 
forma imperi). It is a legal constitution, which “aus dem reinen Quell des Rechtsbegriffs 
entsprungen” (derives from the pure source of the concept of law). Thus, Kant distinguishes 
the political constitution (though he does not designate it as such) from the legal constitution, 
which in his time existed only as rational or natural law. In Kant’s age and for a long time 
afterwards, in terms of positive law, constitutions were at best mere political constitutions, 
whereas the legal constitution obtained as a political or natural legal principle. 
The republican constitution is the constitution about the contents of the legal system. 
According to Kant, the essential content of the legal system is a certain kind of freedom: 
“Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff der Bedingungen unter denen die Willkühr des anderen 
nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereignt werden kann.” [Law is 
therefore the set of conditions, under which the freedom of one can be united with that of 
the others under the general laws Freedom.] (SA VIII 337) The other element of the concept 
of law, the distinctive feature of positive law, is the relationship with coercion (Befugnis 
zum Zwingen): law entails the limitation of freedom. The other element of the concept of 
positive law, what Kant designates as the publicity of law, is public law (öffentliches 
Recht=public law) “Inbegriff der Gesetze, die einen allgemeinen Bekanntmachung bedürfen, 
um einen rechtlichen Zustand hervorzubringen.” (SA VIII 429). In our terms, the “lawful 
condition” for Kant can be described as the existence of the legal system, since the meaning 
of the Kantian “Gesetz” is norm in our terms.19 Therefore, without the publicity 
(promulgation) of the norms of the legal system no positive law can exist. We need to note, 
18 Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Oxford, 1971.
19 See Stemmer, P.: Normativität. Berlin, 2008, 155.
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however, that for Kant, certain principles of private law and constitutional law, not to 
mention morality, are a priori given for practical reason and as such, do not need publication 
at all.
The ﬁ rst principle of the republican constitution is freedom, so far as according to 
Kant, man has a single innate and simultaneously positive right:  “Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit 
von eines anderen nötigenden Willkühr), sofern sie mit jedes anderen Freiheit nach einem 
allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann” [Freedom (independence from the coercive 
arbitrariness of others), so far as it can persist jointly with the freedom of everyone else on 
grounds of general laws] (SA VIII 345).20 This concept of freedom is extremely interesting 
from the point of view of the neo-constitutionalist theory of constitutional review. As it is 
clear from the quotation, for Kant freedom includes several fundamental rights, such as 
equality, the protection of privacy and freedom of speech, which can be deduced from the 
Kantian concept of freedom from the outset. In other words, the Kantian concept of freedom 
implies the entirety of fundamental rights to be guaranteed for all in the lawful condition 
(that is, in the legal system of constitutional state). In terms of contemporary constitutional 
law, Kant here discusses fundamental constitutional freedoms or constitutional rights. These 
are “innate” rights, and as such that they are due to each person equally and that freedom 
(that is, fundamental rights) does not have to be “acquired” or “deserved” like ordinary 
rights under any legal system.
It is manifest so far that Kant considers constitutional freedoms, in other words 
fundamental rights, to be the legally necessary (by which Kant means obligatory) content of 
the legal system.21 Modern constitutional review does the same: the constitutional review of 
legislation is a means to protect constitutional rights taken over from rational law or if one 
prefers, natural law.
In strict terms, we cannot claim that modern constitutional courts reviewing legislation 
“enforce” constitutional rights as mandatory contents of legal norms, since these categorical 
legal principles are meta-norms about the norms of conduct of the legal system. The 
determination of the standard of goodness or justiﬁ ability (frequently identiﬁ ed with justice) 
of legal norms used to be the function of natural law, also shared by Kant. For the rationalist 
thought the principles commanded by reason are categorical, as the famous categorical 
imperative is. Being categorical means that neither the mandatory force, nor its validity 
may rationally be challenged. (The categorical imperative is, according to Kant, synthetic a 
priori. See e.g. Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten. SA VII 49, Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft. SA VI 49, 67.) There are categorical, unconditional legal principles22 included in 
the Kantian concept of freedom, that are valid without positive law-making as the standard 
of the correctness of law, but they do not form part of positive law. Constitutions regulating 
the content of legal order contain (mainly in the forms constitutional rights) the standard of 
justiﬁ cation of legal norms, not unlike the natural law. The relationship between the sub-
constitutional law and the constitutional principles is conceptual and derivative. A good 
case demonstrating such a justiﬁ catory reasoning in constitutional law is justiﬁ cation the 
20 H. L. A. Hart formulates almost in so many words. Hart, H. L. A.: Are There Any Natural 
Rights? In: Waldron, J. (ed.): Theories of Rights. Oxford, 1984, 77 skk.–however, without mentioning 
Kant.
21 According to Kant, the obligatoriness (Verbindlichkeit) of conduct consists in its normative 
necessity in present-day terms. 
22 On the term see Höffe, O.: Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien. Frankfurt am Main, 1995.
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limitation of fundamental rights as applied in many European constitutional jurisdictions. 
Constitutional review essentially decides on the constitutional validity (admissibility) of 
norms including norms governing the conduct of citizens, not about the interpretation and 
application of norms of conduct or primary norms. 
In Kantian constitutional theory, as mentioned above, the rational state establishes the 
legal condition (Rechtszustand) among its citizens. Legal freedom consists in lawful 
freedom and an equal subjection to law: legal freedom is protected by state coercion (SA 
VIII 338) through the enforcement of the law. This is the constitutional concept of freedom 
in the 18th century prevalent until the mid-20th century, classically formulated by 
Montesquieu: anybody subject only to law is free.23 According to the modern concept of 
law under constitutional law, law as expression de la volonté générale has two basic 
properties: it is a general rule, and is deemed to be accepted by people through its adoption 
by a representative organ, like the Parliament. This conception does not distinguish the 
between constitution and the ordinary law, thus it excludes by virtue of conceptual necessity 
the possibility of an unconstitutional law. The constitution is a set of rules about the law-
making, including the sources of law; any law adopted in a regular procedure is necessarily 
constitutional.24 This constitutional theory locates the guarantee of the correctness of the 
law in the legislative procedure: the law-making procedure (its publicity and discursive 
nature) is regarded as sufﬁ cient to ensure a reasonable outcome. Today, the main argument 
against modern, especially neo-constitutionalist constitutional review is the reasonableness 
of the legislative procedure, and the argument that the legislation is better suited for the 
proper interpretation of the constitutional rights than the judicial procedure of constitutional 
review.25 This argument, to be sure, does not contradict to the maxim of legislation, which 
Kant describes as a “blosse Idee der Vernunft” [mere idea of reason] (SA XI 153).
According to Kant, the third element of the republican constitution following the 
equality of citizens is what he calls Unabhängigkeit, which is especially interesting from 
our point of view. Kant, like the French constitution of 1791, distinguished active and 
passive citizens and secured political rights exclusively for citizens with self-sufﬁ cient 
economic-social existence. On the basis of his examples, it is obvious that only citizens 
who are their own masters (sui iuris) owing to their property or by virtue of their profession 
may be citoyen with the right to vote in legislation or the elections. However, they are to be 
considered equal whatever the difference among their properties may be (SA XI 150; as 
well as VIII 432). Kant was not an early adherent of the welfare state; rather, in his notes he 
23 Montesquieu: De l’esprit des lois, XI. 3 (ed. Pléiade II. 395.): “La liberté est le droit de faire 
tous que les lois permettent”. Cf.: Bragyova, A.: Alkotmány és szabadság: a szabadság alkotmányos 
fogalma (The Constitution and Freedom: the Constitutional Concept of Freedom). Fundamentum, 7 
(2003) 3–4, 5 skk. and Bragyova, A.: The constitutional concept of the freedom of the individual. 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), 91 (2005), 379–408. 
24 Jellinek, G.: Gesetz und Verordnung. Tübingen, 1887 and Carré de Malberg, R.: La loi, 
expréssion de la volonté générale. Paris, 1931.
25 In modern Anglo-Saxon literature, the most famous defendant of this view is Jeremy Waldron 
(e.g. The Dignity of Legislation, Cambridge, 1999 and Law and Disagreement, Oxford, 1999). These 
views were already discussed in 19th century and later French and German literature. A characteristic 
opponent of constitutional review is Lambert, E.: Le gouvernement des juges. Paris, 1921, especially, 
224 skk. In recent continental theory, Habermas and his followers, e.g. Ingeborg Maus are sceptical as 
to substantive constitutional review. See Maus, I.: Zur Aufklärung der Demokratietheorie. Frankfurt 
am Main, 1992.
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appears to be (one could say) a forerunner of Hayek: “Die Wohltätigkeit kann nur auf 
Kosten der Unterhanen ausgeübt werden.” [Public welfare is possible exclusively at the 
expense of the subjects.] (AA 23. 354) Here I cannot discuss the relationship of the welfare 
and the constitutional state; sufﬁ ce it to say that the welfare state is the consequence of the 
radical implementation of the Kantian principles of the constitutional state. The principle of 
equality and the maxim of legislation (to be discussed below) and the idea of the constitution 
as a social contract make the welfare state conceptually inevitable. The freedom and the 
autonomy of the individual depend on social conditions: those not possessing the conditions 
of freedom and autonomy could claim, on the basis of the principle of equality the same 
conditions others have. Not for Kant, since as he says independence is in part (but only 
partially) acquired and not innate right, like freedom. At the same time, it is problematic to 
postulate a rational individual who would accept that his independence (social non-
dependence) is subject to contingency, in Kant’s terms, empirical social circumstances. In 
today’s constitutional democracies, the equality and independence of the citizen has become 
inseparable, while in Kant’s age they were still separable.26 
Kant and generally the Enlightenment were not democrats in our terms. They accepted 
the representative system based on the separation of legislation and executive power (which 
Kant as the authors of the Federalist Papers27 call republican), but they did not accept 
democracy based on the participation of the empirical people as a whole. The requirement 
of Unabhängigkeit [by the German term Kant means personal and ﬁ nancial non-dependence 
(sibisufﬁ tientia)] excludes a great part of the empirical people from among active citizens. 
Modern constitutional democracies are in an ideal case and in Kantian terms simultaneously 
republican and democratic constitutional systems, which Kant and his contemporaries held 
impossible. Nevertheless, Kant’s is right in claiming that constitutional democracy can exist 
only as representative democracy; however, representative democracy presupposes the 
social freedom of the individual, which requires the guarantee the minimum of the social-
economic independence of the individual (pace Kant, who regarded external freedom as 
independence from others’ coercion). In other words: constitutional democracy (and here 
one must agree with Kant) requires the freedom of the cives as individual not subject to the 
power of others, which simultaneously requires a kind of “social democracy” (to use 
Tocqueville’s term). Today, an inﬂ uential trend of modern liberalism, called republicanism 
postulates that freedom is grounded on the non-subjectedness to the power of others.28 The 
same is implied by Kant’s concept of “non-dependence”. True in Kant’s case it lead , to the 
exclusion of those subject to the power of others (such as wage workers and servants) from 
among active citizens. Still it is possible to argue on the same ground in the contrary 
direction as many supporters of modern constitutional welfare rights in fact do.
IV. THE MAXIM OF LEGISLATION 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
26 Luf, G.: Freiheit und Gleichheit. Die Aktualität im politischen Denken Kants. Wien, 1978. 
150 skk.
27 Wright, B. F. (ed.): The Federalist. Cambridge, 1972, 133, 150. (No. 10.,14.; the author of 
both is Madison, J.).
28 See Pettit, Ph.: Republicanism. Oxford, 1997 and Spitz, J-F.: La liberté politique. Paris, 
1995.
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In the former section we saw that the freedom of the individual in a constitutional state 
consists in her being subject exclusively to general and public rules of law. Therefore, the 
procedure of legislation, the content of the law and its general validity are fundamental in 
maintaining constitutional freedom. The freedom (autonomy) of the individual can be 
exercised so that it should not conﬂ ict with others, thus, equal individual autonomy for 
everybody can be guaranteed only by equal limitations imposed upon each others’ freedom–
and this is the function of the legal order. Also, this is the source of the maxim of legislation. 
By the concept of the maxim Kant means “the subjective principle of action” (Willkühr 
=choice, empirical will), which the actor makes the rule of his own action (Rechtslehre 
Einleitung IV, SA VIII 332). Therefore, the maxim of legislation as the principle determining 
and justifying all actions is either correct or incorrect. The maxim of the law is identical 
with the principles justifying legislation as an action. On these grounds we can analyse 
Kant’s explications on the maxim of legislation.
According to this maxim, the legislator has to make law (=norm), which could derive 
from the whole people and which can be regarded by each subject (at law), as if he approved 
of it. “Denn das ist das Probierstein der Rechtsmässigkeit eines jeden öffentlichen Gesetzes. 
[The criterion of the lawfulness/correctness of all public law.] (SA XI 244) In Zum ewigen 
Frieden Kant formulates the transcendental formula of public law, that is, law-making to be 
proclaimed and applying to all,29 which he designates as the principle of publicity. As he 
sets forth: “all actions related to others’ rights are unlawful (unrecht), if their maxim does 
not tolerate publicity”. Thereby, Kant unites the idea of the social contract with the concept 
of the rational justiﬁ ability of the norm (long before Habermas and Rawls). As for Kant, the 
law is lawful, i.e. correct, if it complies with the maxim of legislation and the transcendental 
formula of publicity,30 otherwise lawful law would be a tautology. 
For Kant, the ultimate identity of the two formulas, i.e. rational admissibility and 
publicity derives from the concept of reason. Kant associates rationality with publicity. The 
fundamental concept of Kant’s philosophy is reason (Vernunft), the use of which is generally 
public, just as in science.31 The society can never be deprived of the right of the public use 
of reason, i.e. thinking as he formulates in his writing “An Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment?” (SA XI 55). The consent of the subject (of law) is not a real consent–this 
is provided by the participation in the law-making of the representative organ (Parliament). 
The standard (criterion) of the justiﬁ ability of the law is that the rational subject at law 
would have made (adopted, accepted) the same law if he had the necessary knowledge.32 
This reformulated maxim of legislation is closely related to the discourse theory of 
Habermas, according to which rationality is identical with the norm (or other statement) 
acceptable in the ideal discourse-situation. The law (the legal norm) is rationally acceptable, 
29 Das öffentliche Recht ist der Inbegriff öffentlicher Gesetze (d.i. solcher die durch einen 
machthabenden Gesetzgeber allen denen eine Pﬂ icht obliegt verkündigt werden). AA 23. 347. [Public 
law implies the entirety of public laws to be mandatorily proclaimed by the legislative power.]
30 The transcendental nature of the formula postulates that its validity does not depend on 
empirical circumstances, which could inﬂ uence the decision of the legislator, such as economic or 
practical, etc. considerations, but it needs to be applied to these.
31 As many have noticed, Kant usually draws a parallel between the activity of reason and that 
of the judge or the legislator, but we must restrict ourselves to a note. This by all means implies the 
publicity or public justiﬁ ability of judgement (by which Kant also means cognitive statements).
32 There is a slight difference between the two formulas, since according to the latter one, 
several admissible versions are possible.
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if the participants of the ideal discourse, which excludes coercion and is conducted under 
ideally good conditions, would have adopted it as a reasonable norm. Clearly, the main 
difference between the concepts of reason of Kant and Habermas is that Kant examines the 
rationality of arguments, whereas Habermas examines the procedure of reasoning, i.e. the 
relationship of arguments and compares the force of arguments, which in an ideal case 
facilitates the success of “zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments” [the forceless force 
of the better argument].
In modern political and legal philosophy, the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas and 
the political liberalism of John Rawls are directly and admittedly related to Kant’s principle of 
publicity. In Political Liberalism, Rawls applies the anglicised term of public reason and 
considers the constitutional court–in the form the US Supreme Court–as its main forum. 
Habermas considerably departs from Kant (and in this repect, from Rawls too), since he 
deﬁ nes the public use of reason to be a social institution (procedure). The difference between 
the two views is manifest in their attitude towards majority decision-making, and its proper 
roel in modern constitutional democracy. The Kantian standard is counterfactual: the reason 
examines whether the subjects would have adopted a norm. This is the requirement of the 
rational justiﬁ ability of a norm, the decision on which depends on the correct use of reason. In 
the discourse theory of Habermas, especially in Faktizität und Geltung, discourse consists in 
communicative action and as such, embedded in a social context. On the other hand, the 
concept of the ideal discourse situation is as normative as Kant’s maxim of legislation. 
According to Habermas, “Gilt nur das Recht als legitim, das aus der diskursiven Meinungs- 
und Willensbildung gleichberechtigter Staatsbürger hervorgeht”.33 [Only the law is legitimate, 
which derives from the discursive formulation of the opinion and will of equal citizens.] In the 
same work, Habermas expounds: “Discourse theory explains the legitimacy of the law via the 
legally institutionalised procedural and communicational conditions.”34 Habermas also needs 
to explain what Kant does not: in a procedural democracy protecting a set of fundamental 
rights (Habermas calls this “System der Rechte”), especially the rights of minorities? Habermas 
also accepts the principle of publicity, since in void of modern communicational rights it is 
impossible to make legitimate law (Kant calls this rechtsmässig), however, he regards both the 
principle of publicity and people’s sovereignty as discourse and procedure.
From the point of view of constitutional theory, the relationship between rationality 
and public justiﬁ cation is the most important. In politics, the use of reason is collective and 
public: constitutional rights and constitutional decision-making procedures, such as political 
participation rights, elections, legislation and the entirety of communicational rights as 
safeguards of the freedom of the social communication process as a whole facilitate political 
decision-making based on public reasoning and debate. It is a crucial issue in the justiﬁ cation 
of constitutional review whether discursive democracy as a procedure–including the 
principle of publicity, which, like its counterpart, the categorical imperative is formal in the 
sense of being devoid of content–is sufﬁ cient to guarantee the constitutional rights, freedom 
and equality, which are also foundational for Kant. Majority decision cannot be deduced 
from the principles of discursivity and publicity, but it’s a practically necessary procedural 
rule (at least as second best) in the legislative procedure. This is expressly acknowledged by 
Kant in Gemeinspruch (SA XI 152–153). In practice, democratic collective self-legislation 
33 Habermas, J.: Faktizität und Geltung. Frankfurt am Main, 2. Auﬂ age, 1992, 492.
34 Ibid. 499. 
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(Selbstgesetzgebung)35 is based on the majority principle, although the theory of discursive 
democracy requires considerably more than the (political) majority of legislation in the 
interest of the establishment of democratic legitimacy. Although, “the democratically 
legitimate formation of opinion and will” is impossible without constitutional rights, and it 
is based on constitutional rules of procedure, they are ex deﬁ nitone insufﬁ cient to protect 
the rights of the individual against the majority. Thus, a discursive-rational procedural 
constitutional democracy also needs the judicial protection of the constitution. It is 
impossible to justify satisfactorily procedural rules by other procedural rules, nor can the 
content of the law be justiﬁ ed by the correctness of the law-making procedure. The 
constitution understood as a social contract in Kantian terms is capable to justify both.
Constitutional democracy is impossible without appropriate institutions and rules, thus 
the constitution conceptually (and historically) precedes democracy. Trivially, democracy is 
a constitutional regime: it cannot exist but through democratic constitutional norms. The 
function of ensuring the impartial observation of procedural rules rationally cannot be 
entrusted exclusively to the participants of the procedure. The procedural justiﬁ cation of 
constitutional review is based on this insight. For Habermas, the principle of publicity is a 
subsidiary principle in terms of the judicial construction of the constitution since the 
content-based criteria of legitimate, i.e. constitutionally valid law are to be found in the set 
of fundamental rights (System der Rechte). Fundamental constitutional rights are legal 
positions of the individual deﬁ ning for the legislator part of the content of law entailed by 
the maxim of legislation. In this sense, fundamental rights are a sort of positive natural law 
not subject to legislative disposal not guaranteed by the procedure of constitutional 
democracy.36 For those who are familiar with neo-constitutionalist or just modern 
constitutional law, the requirement of “rational (i.e. public) justiﬁ cation” is not a 
philosophical, but a legal dogmatic term. In applying the constitutional equality rule most 
constitutional courts use the principle of public justiﬁ ability as a test of reasonableness of 
classiﬁ cation by the legislator.37
Constitutional review is a lawful way to exercise the right of resistance against 
government. Kant rejected the right to active resistance against the “unrechtmässig” (unjust 
or unlawful) power; even if it infringed the maxim of legislation.38 But he did not reject 
resistance through public argument and reasoning. As he wrote in the Dispute of the 
Faculties: “Why hasn’t any sovereign dared to say that he didn’t recognise any right of the 
people against himself?” (SA XI 359). The answer is: because the principle of publicity is 
an indispensable element of the legitimacy of legislation. Since the principle of publicity 
necessarily includes the possibility of public räsonnieren, we can infer that Kant recognises 
resistance via reasoning. Kant, who always expressed his appreciative views about Hume’s 
35 Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten [Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals] 
(SA VII 63).
36 Maus, I.: Freiheitsrechte und Volksouverenität, Rechtstheorie, 26 (1995) 507–562. Here for 
lack of space we cannot introduce the immanent limitations of procedural democracy. For a part of 
the relevant literature see Bragyova, A.: Alkotmánybíráskodás és demokrácia (Constitutional Review 
and Democracy). Acta Juridica et Politica, 55 (1996), 135 skk.
37 Bragyova, A.: Egyenlőség és alkotmány (Equality and the Constitution). In: Lamm, V. (ed.): 
Van és Legyen a jogban. Tanulmányok Peschka Vilmos tiszteletére (Is and Ought in Law. Studies in 
Honour of Vilmos Peschka). Budapest, 2000. 
38 Spaemann, R.: Kants Kritik der Widerstandrechts. In: Batscha, Z. (Hrsg.): Materialen zu 
Kants Rechtsphilosophie. Frankfurt am Main, 1976, 347.
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works and called him “a man of sharpest wit” in the Prolegomena (SA V 116), might have 
agreed with the statement of Hume, according to which “[i]t is … only on opinion that 
government is founded.”39 He understood very well that the greatest limitation of political 
power is publicity or, in modern terms, public opinion. Thus, we can understand Kant’s 
explications, namely, that resistance has one lawful means, which he calls “Freiheit der 
Feder” (SA XI 161, XII 409) and this means the freedom of the press, naturally, the 
reasoning press. The freedom of the pen is “das einzige Palladium der Volksrechte” [the 
only safeguard of people’s rights] (XI 161), which as a freedom is the control (Prüfung) of 
the scientiﬁ c propositions in science and of “the correctness of the judgement” of the state 
power, the monarch in politics (XII 409). Thus, according to Kant, there is no monarch, or 
a fortiori any political power and decision-maker, that would not be in need of the constant 
criticism of “the correctness of its judgement”.
For Kant, the “freie Rechtslehrer, d.i. die Philosophen” [free legal scholars, i.e. 
philosophers] (SA XI 363) are to protect natural rights by public reasoning which they 
address to the state with due veneration (ehrerbietig). In Kant’s age, the protection of what 
we now call fundamental rights devolved on free legal scholars, who–according to the Streit 
der Fakultäten, where he claims that only the lower, that is, the philosophical faculty is 
free, whereas the others, such as the faculty of law is bound by positive regulations (SA XI 
280–287)–could only be philosophers, not lawyers. This is a consequence of the Kantian 
idea of rational law: the constitutional rights constitutive of the positive legal system in 
neo-constitutionalism were generally not considered to be positive legal rights in the 18th–
19th (and in a large part of 20th) centuries, even though they were incorporated into the 
constitution.40 It was publicity–public opinion–that protected the constitutional rights, which 
corresponded to the judgement of the educated general public emerging in the age of 
Kant.41 
The modern public sphere (analysed masterfully in well-known book of Habermas),42 
is far cry from the reasoning public consisting mainly of the educated middle and upper 
classes of the 18th century. The ideal discourse situation of Habermas–closely related to the 
Kantian principle of publicity, since ideal discourse consists in the public use of reason–
cannot be identical with modern political public, let alone the empirical public opinion. 
Therefore, modern constitutional review can be regarded as the forum of the public use of 
reason43 which enforces the maxim of legislation, if the empirical political legislator failed 
to do so. Hence, it is reasonable to claim that modern constitutional review consists in the 
institutionalisation of publicly reasoning resistance, which is always permissible in Kant’s 
terms and which we can designate as reasoning resistance. This conception derives directly 
from the principle of publicity presented above. This is a forceful corroboration of the 
procedural justiﬁ cation of constitutional review, which can be accepted by Habermas as 
well as the democrats rejecting constitutional review.
39 Hume, D.: Essays. In: The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Edinburgh, 1826, 
Vol. III, 31.
40 This is summarised perfectly in Duguit, L.: Traité de droit constitutionnel. Paris, 2nd ed., 
Tome III., 1923, 566 skk.; and Troper: op. cit.
41 Tönnies, F.: Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung. Berlin, 1922.
42 Habermas, J.: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 1962 (new ed.: Frankfurt am Main, 1990); 
on the principle of publicity: 178 skk.
43 In this issue, Rawls is more far-reaching than Habermas, who is more trustful with regard to 
procedural-discursive democracy. See, e.g. Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism, op. cit. 212 skk.
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As it is clear from the Hufeland-review (SA XI 809), Kant concurred with Hobbes that 
nobody is obliged to obey coercion. Therefore, the state needs to be able to crush physical 
opposition by force or convince the subjects about the “legality” of its power (legitimacy in 
our terms). A state or government bound to protect and observe fundamental rights can use 
only limited force against its subjects (citizens); therefore, it can exist for a longer period 
only if the citizens bear at least benevolent indifference towards it. Of course, the machinery 
of the power of the state can function further on without this, but only as long as coercion 
(and the efﬁ ciency of the threat of its application) actually enables it to do so. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of the constitutional state is positively based on the limitation of the lawful 
use of force thus giving the priority to the communicative power against the coercive one.
V. CONSTITUTION AND MORALITY
To conclude, I wish to discuss the question of constitution and morality with the help of 
Kant. According to the idea of the constitution in Platonic terms (that is, in reality never 
perfectly realised) which is in accordance with the natural rights of man, everybody bound 
by the law (norm) is simultaneously a legislator on equal footing with others. For Kant this 
is the respublica noumenon, the transcendental norm of all constitutions (SA XI 364). The 
realisable form of the respublica noumenon, i.e. the respublica phaenomenon is the 
republican constitution. The republican constitution is conceived as a version of the state 
(“Vereinigung einer Menge der Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen”) [the association of men 
under of law] (SA VIII 431), in which the constitution is “oberste formale Bedingung 
(conditio sine qua non) aller übrigen äusseren Pﬂ icht” [the principal formal condition of all 
external obligations] (SA XI 144). In my terms, the legal system for Kant primarily and 
practically consists in the inevitable limitation of freedom of conduct, the primary objective 
of which is the protection of the external freedom of the individual (including property). 
The constitution and the legal system are morally necessary for the individual primarily 
because they establish the external conditions of moral life: the “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” 
[civil society] cannot exist without a Staatsverfassung [a constitution] (SA XII 687).
Kant’s conception of mankind was sufﬁ ciently pessimistic so that he could not conceive 
a society without legal force and political power. Therefore, the political society, i.e. the 
constitutional Rechtszustand is not based at all on the morality of the participants, but on 
practical necessity and rationality. Therefore, “Das Problem der Staatseinrichtung ist, so 
hart wie es auch klingt, selbst für ein Volk von Teufeln (wenn sie nur Verstand haben), 
auﬂ ösbar.” [The problem of the foundation of the state, however harsh it may sound, can be 
solved by even a people (if it has understanding) consisting of devils] (SA XI 224). The 
foundation of the existence of the state (for Kant, that implies the law and order and public 
laws) is not a moral or other high motive, which devils would lack, but it is practical 
necessity conceivable merely by understanding (Verstand) and not by reason (Vernunft) 
including also the moral a priori. Therefore, law accounts for not the morally, but the 
practically necessary conduct, which “Mechanism der Natur durch selsbsüchtige Neigungen 
… von der Vernunft zu Mittel gebraucht werden kann… (SA XI 225).” “Die Natur will 
unwiderstehlich, dass das Recht zuletzt die Obergewalt enthalte.” [Nature irresistibly wants 
law to possess the supreme power]. Let me add that Kant’s works on legal philosophy 
mostly deal with a part of the metaphysics of law–the title of his legal theory is 
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe–and by metaphysics Kant means a priori knowledge. 
Besides, Kant admits the legitimacy of “purely empirical legal theory”, undoubtedly with 
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the limitation that it resembles the wooden head in the tale of Phaedrus, namely, it can be 
beautiful but unfortunately it does not have a brain (SA VIII 336). In one of his reﬂ ections, 
he clearly distinguishes the empirical-political (we could say contingent) elements from the 
rational ones (deriving from reason) in constitutions. As he formulates that: “Staatsklugheit 
ist blos auf empirische Prinzipien gegründet, Staatsrecht auf rationale. Man vermengt die 
Bedingungen der ersten bei dem Begriffe einer Staatsverfassung überhaupt mit dem 
letzteren.” (R. 6855. AA XIX 181) [The theory of governance is based on purely empirical 
principles, whereas constitutional law is based on rational ones. In case of the general 
concept of the constitution of the state, the conditions of the ﬁ rst one are united with these 
of second one.]
Kant’s work on the philosophy of religion, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
blossen Vernunft (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) is most instructive from the 
present point of view, since here Kant’s standpoint is clearly expressed: the legal condition 
(rechtlich-bürgerlicher or political Zustand) is at the same time an ethical state of nature. In 
the state of nature everybody is simultaneously one’s own legislator and judge (SA VIII 
753): in the legal order the state of nature persists with regard to morality. We can add that 
if it did not persist, the autonomous moral life in Kant’s terms would be impossible. Since 
moral virtues are duties towards ourselves, exclusively we can be our own judges in these 
issues. According to Kant, the State is not a moral, but a legal community; therefore, the 
constitutional State cannot be a moral community either. This precludes the moral 
interpretation not only of the constitution, but of law altogether. For Kant, the moral 
community (ethisches gemeines Wesen) can only be conceived as “Volk Gottes” (the people 
of God) “und zwar nach Tugendgesetzen” (viz. only on grounds of moral laws) (SA VIII 
757) where there is no place for external force. Religion consists in the recognition of our 
duties as divine commandment (SA VIII 762, 788), whereas virtue consists in the voluntary 
fulﬁ lment of moral duties (SA VIII 526). It is only God who knows whether the individual 
was guided in the voluntary accomplishment of his moral duty by the motive of the respect 
for moral duty alone, or by also something else (and for Kant the conduct is not moral in 
the latter case). 
Thus, according to Kant, the constitution establishes merely a Rechtszustand, but not 
an “ethical” community based on virtue. The establishment of an ethical community, the 
moral constitution proper cannot be the objective of the constitution. Moreover, Kant warns 
against the legal enforcement of virtue (moral conduct) in the following paragraph of 
Religion innerhalb…“Wehe aber dem Gesetzgeber, der eine auf ethische Zwecke gerichtete 
Verfassung durch Zwang bewirken wollte. Denn würde dadurch nicht allein gerade das 
Gegenteil der ethischen bewirken, sondern auch seine politische Untergraben und unsicher 
machen”. [Woe is the legislator, who intends to implement a constitution directed at ethical 
objectives by force. In doing so, he would achieve not only just the opposite of the ethical, 
but he would also undermine and shake the political constitution.] (SA VIII 754) As he 
explicates, it is the legal force that protects (external) freedom and thereby maintains the 
ethical natural state, necessary for the existence of autonomos moral life. However, the 
ethical natural state differs basically from the legal natural state, to which the command of 
exeundo est e statu naturali applies. For Kant “alle politischen Bürger” exist in an ethical 
state of nature (ethischer Naturzustand) which is at the same time the constitutional-legal 
condition.
Thus, for Kant, the constitutional-legal condition is simultaneously moral state of 
nature: the moral, but not the legal, freedom of each and every person is complete in this 
condition. The legal meaning of constitutional rights, the Rechtszustand, as we have seen is 
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triadic for Kant: freedom, equality and independence for the propertied citizens (cives). 
These rights are political in the sense that they can be construed exclusively as constitutional 
rights, as part of a social contract. In other words, these are not moral rights but the 
constitutional properties of a society based on legal principles, which establish the external 
conditions of moral and social autonomy. Nevertheless, these attributes are not moral for at 
least two reasons. First, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the collectivity of 
individuals promotes the coordination of their conduct affecting others under general 
coercive laws. In morality, however, everyone is simultaneously legislator and judge: this is 
the ethical state of nature guaranteed in a constitutional condition of the law. The intervention 
of the legislator, which transforms moral duty into legal duty, inevitably destroys the moral 
nature of the conduct, since it is not any more based on autonomous (inner) legislation.44
At the same time, for Kant, not all constitutions are just (rechtsmässig). It is helpful as 
to the translation of the terms rechtens or rechtsmässig that Kant frequently adds the Latin 
equivalent of the terms: iustum. It is altogether clear that Kant does not refer to any kind of 
positive lawfulness in connection with the “lawful” constitution, but he means a constitution 
which corresponds to reason and is based on the practical use of reason. In this constitution 
it is primarily the transcendental principle of publicity that can guarantee the agreement 
between morality and public law (SA XI 244 ff.). This principle, which I discussed in the 
previous section, is simultaneously ethical (pertaining to the doctrine of virtues) and legal 
(affecting the rights of man). In the quoted place Kant discusses the people’s right to 
resistance, which cannot be positive law from the outset.45 Therefore, the content of the 
constitution may be in harmony simultaneously with morality and law, but the constitution 
itself is not a moral institution. The combined effect of the principles of the republican 
constitution and the transcendental formula of publicity facilitates that in the modern 
constitutional state the legal system be rational without being exclusively or primarily a 
moral state. The idea of law, which consists in guaranteeing external freedom for each 
individual, is incompatible either with the legal enforcement of morality or with individual 
happiness as an objective of the state (Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht SA XII 686). 
Both of these would limit the autonomy of the individual to a greater extent than absolutely 
necessary. One is tempted to say that the moral principles determine the proper scope of the 
law: it ought not invade into the properly moral sphere of individuals, the latter being 
reserved for the working of autonomous moral life.
Thus, the principles of the republican constitution are legal, not moral principles. The 
modern, especially the neo-constitutionalist constitutional state may closely resemble what 
Kant considered to be “the constitution in accordance with man’s natural rights” (Streit der 
Fakultäten SA XI 360). Modern constitutions usually include the principles of the Kantian 
republican (lawful, that is, just) constitution as constitutional rights, and principles. If so, 
the constitutional rights can hardly be regarded as moral principles in Kantian terms, since 
the constitution is not a moral institution, either. Simultaneously, Kant identiﬁ es a close 
relationship between morals (Sitten) and the principles of the constitutional state. This 
relationship, however, does not pertain to morality but it is part of the practical reason. For 
Kant, as we saw, the principles of the republican constitution can be recognised and accepted 
44 For a similar view: Dreier, H.: Kants Republik. In: Gerhardt, V. (Hrsg.): Kants Streit der 
Fakultäten. Berlin, 2005, 134 ff.
45 Scheffel, D.: Kants kritische Verwerfung des Revolutionsrechts. In: Brandt, R. (Hrsg.): 
Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung. Berlin, 1981, 178 skk.
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through (the necessarily collective) use of reason, just as morally correct conduct can be 
recognised by the use of reason. Therefore, the legal nature of constitutional rights is not 
based on their moral content but on practical rationality. 
* * *
Nearly all the works of Kant quoted above are available in several excellent English 
editions. Still, I quote Kant’s works from the standard German editions, giving my own 
translation. I do so not by reason of disrespect for the translators, but simply because I used 
these texts. The quoted passages are easily identiﬁ able and controllable in the standard 
English translations. The German texts are quoted from the Studienausgabe, except when 
the quoted text cannot be found there; in that case I quote it from the Akademie-Ausgabe.
